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Is Foreign Hazardous Waste Really the Same as
Domestic Hazardous Waste When Imported
into the U.S.?
I. Introduction
A great deal has been written on the exportation of domestic
hazardous waste,' including case law on the interstate shipment of
domestically produced hazardous waste.2 However, the importation
of foreign generated hazardous waste and the laws governing this
waste in interstate commerce within the United States is a relatively
uncharted area. A recent federal district court decision precisely ad-
dressed this area. 3
Federal law does not preclude approved state hazardous waste
programs from "adopting or enforcing requirements which are more
stringent or more extensive than those required" by federal regula-
tion.4 However, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, a fed-
eral district court held that Louisiana's attempt to ban the
importation of any hazardous waste generated in a foreign country
was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause.5 In
arriving at this conclusion, the district court relied on the same prin-
ciples and reasoning as those used in examining the interstate ship-
ment of domestically generated hazardous waste. 6
This Note will examine both the logic and the implications of
I See, e.g., Peter Obstler, Toward a Working Solution to Global Pollution: Importing CER-
CLA to Regulate the Export of Hazardous Waste, 16 YALEJ. INT'L L. 73 (1991); Peter D.P. Vint,
The International Export of Hazardous Waste: European Economic Community, United States, and
International Law, 129 MIL. L. REV. 107 (1990); Mary Critharis, Note, Third World Nations Are
Down in the Dumps: The Exportation of Hazardous Waste, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 311 (1990).
2 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management,
910 F.2d 713, 719 (1 1th Cir. 1990)("dangers associated with hazardous waste movement
do not outweigh the value of moving hazardous waste across state lines"), modified, 924
F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991); see also Hardage v. Atkins, 582
F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978)("controlled industrial waste" defined in Oklahoma statute as
refuse products that are toxic to human, animal, or plant life, is within purview of the
Interstate Commerce Clause).
3 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La. 1991).
4 40 C.F.R. § 271.1(i)(1) (1991).
5 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1153. The commerce clause may be found at U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Constitution states that Congress shall have power "[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Id.
6 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1149.
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considering foreign generated hazardous waste, once inside the
United States, as analogous to domestically generated hazardous
waste. In particular, this Note will look at the implications of Tem-
plet's rationale which indicate that states may be able to inhibit or ban
certain types of foreign hazardous waste from treatment, storage, or
disposal within the state, and may be able to inhibit or ban certain
types of foreign hazardous wastes from interstate shipment into the
state.
The rationale used in Templet may create an incentive for states
to ban specific types of domestically produced hazardous waste to
avoid becoming a dumping ground for foreign hazardous waste.
Such bans could encourage some industries to move out-of-state or
even out of the United States. However, even if these industries
move to Mexico, the hazardous wastes generated by these industries
may well end up back in the United States. The court's decision and
rationale could also upset Congress's attempts to allocate equitably
domestically generated hazardous waste among the states. If the
courts do not reject the logic of the Templet holding or Congress does
not intervene, there may be both economic and environmental misal-
location, and the law regarding the interstate Commerce Clause it-
self may have to be redefined.
II. Statement of the Case
A. State Statute Declared Unconstitutional
In Templet, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. ("ChemWaste")
filed an action seeking declaratory relief against Paul H. Templet,
Ph.D., Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality (LDEQ). 7 ChemWaste challenged the constitutionality of
two Louisiana statutes8 governing the importation, storage, and dis-
posal of hazardous waste generated in a foreign country and brought
into Louisiana. 9 One of the statutes states in part:
(2) The laws of foreign nations are inadequate to insure that hazard-
ous wastes sought to be exported to the United States do not con-
tain unknown or unauthorized pollutants and that such wastes are
not released into the environment due to inadequate containment,
labeling, or handling during transport.
(3) The only practical method for insuring that the environment
and the health of the citizens of this state are not endangered by the
importation of hazardous wastes generated in foreign nations is to
prohibit the introduction or receipt of such wastes into this state for
the purpose of treatment, storage, or disposal. 0
7 Id. at 1144.
8 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2190-2191 (West 1989).
9 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1144.
10 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2190(A)(2)-(3) (West 1989).
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The facts in Templet were not seriously disputed by the parties." I
ChemWaste owned and operated an LDEQ authorized hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility in Louisiana.' 2 In
September of 1989, ChemWaste informed the Regional Administra-
tor of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
Texas of its intent to receive at its Louisiana facility foreign hazard-
ous waste generated from Inland System Business Unit of In-
land/Matamores, Mexico and Trico Technologies of Matamores,
Mexico, two maquiladora 13 companies.14  The EPA advised
ChemWaste that since the State of Louisiana was an "authorized"' 5
state under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA),' 6 Louisiana, and not the EPA, was the proper party to
be notified regarding the receipt of hazardous waste from Mexico.' 7
After notification, the LDEQ relied on Louisiana's Revised Statutes
sections 30:2190 and 30:219118 to object to the importation, stor-
age, and disposal of the Mexican foreign hazardous waste in Louisi-
ana and refused to grant ChemWaste a permit.' 9 ChemWaste sued
in a United States district court for declaratory relief, and the court
held that "[sections] 2190 and 2191 are unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution."12 0
B. Hazardous Waste as an Object of Commerce
The Templet court, relying on the Supreme Court decision of City
It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or cause or allow to be
transported into this state, for the purpose of treatment, storage, or disposal,
any hazardous waste generated outside the United States and its territories.
It shall be unlawful for any person to receive for treatment, storage, or
disposal in this state any hazardous waste generated outside the United
States or its territories.
Id. §§ 30:2190(B),(C). The second statute states in part: "The commission or the assistant
secretary shall deny hazardous waste transporter licenses and hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facility permits to all persons who propose to transport into and
dispose of in Louisiana hazardous waste generated in a country other than the United
States." Id. § 30:2191(A).
" I Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1144.
12 Id.
13 The district court stated that " 'Maquiladoras' are companies incorporated under
Mexican corporate law which may be 100% foreign owned and/or managed. The corpo-
ration is allowed to import its raw materials and other items into Mexico without paying
Mexican import taxes." Id. at 1144 n.3.
14 Id. at 1145.
15 The relevant federal statute provides a procedure for the authorization of a state to
administer and enforce a hazardous waste program if the state program meets the speci-
fied conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988). "Such State is authorized to carry out such
program in lieu of the Federal program under this subchapter in such State and to issue
and enforce permits for the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste . Id.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. 1991); 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.1-138.
17 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1145.
18 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
19 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1145.
20 Id. at 1147.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,2' stated that "[a]ll objects of interstate
trade merit... protection; none is excluded by definition at the out-
set. ' 22 The Templet court, quoting the language of City of Philadelphia,
acknowledged that "[a] state may prohibit transportation of an ob-
ject across state lines when 'the article's worth in interstate com-
merce [is] far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very
movement.' ",23 The Templet court further stated: "[c]ertain objects
'are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce.' Such objects are
those objects which in their existing condition at the time of trans-
port could not be safely brought into the state without the risk of
'spread [of] disease, pestilence, and death.' ",24
The Templet court relied heavily on the analysis of City of Philadel-
phia in which the Supreme Court held that a New Jersey law prohibit-
ing the importation of most solid or liquid waste which originated
outside of New Jersey violated the Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution.25 The Supreme Court stated that "j]ust as Congress has
power to regulate the interstate movement of these wastes, States are
not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that
movement." 2
6
The Templet court next cited National Solid Wastes Management
Ass 'n v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management 27 which "held
that hazardous waste is an object of commerce and subject to the
Commerce Clause."'28 In National Solid Wastes, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "[t]o the extent these rules29 can and do
provide for the safe transportation of hazardous waste, the dangers
associated with hazardous waste movement do not outweigh the
value of moving hazardous waste across state lines." 3 0 The court in
21 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
22 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1148 (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622).
23 Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622).
24 Id.
25 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
26 Id. at 622-23.
27 910 F.2d 713 (1th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
28 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1148.
29 The Court of Appeals previously stated in this decision that:
The legislative and executive branches of the federal government together
with the separate states have developed a comprehensive scheme for regulat-
ing the management of hazardous waste. Waste generators, transporters,
and managers must comply with highly technical and rigid rules designed to
ensure that the movement of hazardous waste is accomplished with a mini-
mum of danger to the public and to the environment.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910
F.2d 713, 719 (11 th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001, cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 2800 (1991),
910 F.2d at 719. This quotation supports the notion that the states are not prohibited
from regulating in the area concerning movement of hazardous waste.
30 National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 719. The court's use of "these rules" appears to
be referring to a comprehensive scheme formed from the combination of both state and
federal regulations. See supra note 29. This quotation implies that the combination of both
state and federal rules are necessary to provide for safe transportation of hazardous waste
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National Solid Wastes thus concluded that hazardous waste was an ob-
ject of commerce. 31
C. Domestic and Foreign Generated Hazardous Wastes Are Analogous
Once the Templet court laid this foundation, it stated that
"[wihile the waste considered in the above case was generated within
the United States, the Court believes that the same principles and
reasoning apply to the foreign generated hazardous waste involved
in this case."' 32 In response to LDEQs argument that the statutes do
not ban waste because of its origin,33 but because of the lack of ade-
quate controls by foreign nations, 34 the court stated that "[t]he prob-
lem with LDEQs argument is that Louisiana's ban is based on the
origin of the hazardous waste, rather than on the specific type of haz-
ardous waste." '35 In holding that Louisiana's statutes violated the In-
terstate Commerce Clause, the court stated "that [sections] 2190 and
2191 are discriminatory on their face, or per se discriminatory. Fur-
thermore, the Court finds as a matter of fact and law that the 'quar-
antine power' 36 exception does not apply under the facts of this
case."
37
D. The Foreign Component of the Commerce Clause
Although the Constitution grants Congress power to "regulate
so that the dangers associated with movement do not outweigh the value of moving haz-
ardous waste across state lines.
31 National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 719. The court stated that:
In concluding that hazardous waste is an object of commerce, we follow pre-
cedent of this circuit. See State of Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548,
1555 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1989) ('To the extent plaintiffs also seem to assert injury
based on the out-of-state nature of these wastes [PCBs and other toxic
wastes], the Supreme Court bars such a distinction.' (citing City of Philadel-
phia)), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. United States EPA, 110
S.Ct. 538, 107 L.Ed.2d 535 (1989). Accord Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264,
1266 (10th Cir. 1978) ('controlled industrial waste,' defined in Oklahoma
statute as refuse products that are toxic to human, animal, aquatic, or plant
life, is within purview of commerce clause).
Id.
32 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1149.
33 For the significance of attempting to ban importation of articles because of their
origin, see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
34 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1152.
35 Id.
36 The quarantine clause of the Constitution reads:
No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for execut-
ing its inspections Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid
by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of
the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Control of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. For a discussion on the application of the quarantine power
to interstate commerce, see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
37 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1152.
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commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States" 38 in
the same clause, "there is evidence that the Founders intended the
scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater." 39 The Tem-
plet court did a short analysis of the effect of the foreign component
of the Commerce Clause under the facts of the case. The court held
that "the restrictions placed on the importation of foreign generated
hazardous waste, based solely on the origin of an object of com-
merce, violates the foreign Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. ' 40 The court noted that "[t]he Congress has expressly
authorized in the RCRA regulations the importation of foreign haz-
ardous waste."'4 ' The Templet court also stated that "[t]he Supreme
Court has noted that a higher level of scrutiny is required when for-
eign commerce is restrained, because, unlike interstate commerce,
the United States must speak with a single voice for effective rela-
tions and trade with foreign nations."'42 In addition, "[a]lthough the
Congress's regulatory power over interstate commerce may be lim-
ited by federalism and state sovereignty, the Supreme Court has not
held that such limitations apply to the Congress's power to regulate
foreign commerce." '43
ChemWaste also contended that the Louisiana statutes were in
conflict with agreements between the United States and Mexico 44
and were therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.45
Because the court in Templet found the statutes unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause, it did not feel that it was necessary to
discuss or resolve this issue.46
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The entire text of the Commerce Clause is as follows:
"To regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." Id.
39 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). For further
discussion see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
40 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1153.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1152 (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96
(1984); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980)).
43 Id. at 1152-53 (citingJapan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448 n.13).
44 Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States Regarding the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Haz-
ardous Substances, Nov. 12, 1986, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987) [hereinafter Annex III];
Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Co-
operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10827 [hereinafter 1983 Agreement].
45 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
46 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1153 n.55.
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III. Background
A. Interstate Commerce of Waste
Both Templet and National Solid Wastes referenced the Supreme
Court decision of City of Philadelphia. In City of Philadelphia, the U.S.
Supreme Court examined New Jersey statutes which prohibited the
importation of most solid or liquid waste which originated or was
collected outside of New Jersey. 4 7 As stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the statute "was
designed to protect, not the State's economy, but its environment,
and that its substantial benefits outweigh its 'slight' burden on inter-
state commerce."' 48 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
NewJersey Supreme Court and stated that "the evil of protectionism
can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."' 49 Thus,
according to the Supreme Court, "whatever New Jersey's ultimate
purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against arti-
cles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." 50 The
Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia stated that "[w]hat is crucial is
the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to
many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate
trade."5 l
The Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia also discussed the va-
lidity of quarantine laws:
It is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered for-
bidden protectionist measures, even though they were directed
against out-of-state commerce. But those quarantine laws banned
the importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required
destruction as soon as possible because their very movement risked
contagion and other evils. Those laws thus did not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in
noxious articles, whatever their origin. 52
The Supreme Court then stated that "[t]he NewJersey statute is not
such a quarantine law."15 3 The Court's rationale equated the post-
disposal harms of out-of-state waste and load waste to reach this
conclusion. 54
47 City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978).
48 Id. at 625.
49 Id. at 626.
50 Id. at 626-27.
51 Id. at 628.
52 Id. at 628-29 (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 629.
54 Id. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated:
The fact that New Jersey has left its landfill sites open for domestic waste
does not, of course, mean that solid waste is not innately harmful .... New
Jersey must out of sheer necessity treat and dispose of its solid waste in some
fashionjust as it must treat NewJersey cattle suffering from hoof-and-mouth
disease. It does not follow that New Jersey must, under the Commerce
1992]
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As early as 1978, the 1977 holding in City of Philadelphia was ap-
plied by a circuit court 55 to "controlled industrial waste," which was
defined as "toxic to human, animal, aquatic or plant life." 56 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hardage v. Atkins held that such
"controlled industrial waste" was within the purview of the Interstate
Commerce Clause.57
In National Solid Wastes the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that:
The legislative and executive branches of the federal government
together with the separated states have developed a comprehensive
scheme for regulating the management of hazardous waste .... To
the extent these rules can and do provide for the safe transportation
of hazardous waste, the dangers associated with hazardous waste
movement do not outweigh the value of moving hazardous waste
across state lines.58
The court in National Solid Wastes said that this conclusion comported
with the fact that Alabama had banned the importation into Alabama
of hazardous wastes only from certain states, not from all states. 59
The National Solid Wastes decision was based on the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 198660 (SARA) to the 1980
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA).6 1 The court in National Solid Wastes
stated that the SARA provision at issue62 "requires that each state
present a proposal to EPA showing that the state will have adequate
capacity available to dispose of the hazardous wastes generated
within the state for the next twenty years." 63
B. The Foreign Connection
The Templet case concerns not domestically produced hazardous
waste, but hazardous waste generated in Mexico by maquiladoras64
and imported into the United States. 65 Most of the maquiladoras are
U.S.-owned companies that have located factories in the Mexican
Clause, accept solid waste or diseased cattle from outside its borders and
thereby exacerbate its problems.
Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55 Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
56 Id. at 1265 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2752 (1972)).
57 Id.
58 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management,
910 F.2d 713, 719 (1 1th Cir. 1990). For a further discussion of this quotation see supra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
59 National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 719.
60 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 26 & 42
U.S.C.); see also National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 716.
61 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
62 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
63 National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 716.
64 For a definition of maquiladoras, see supra note 13.
65 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1144.
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border region.66 The companies "take advantage of Mexico's for-
eign investment law, which allows the creation of Mexican companies
that may import their components and raw material into Mexico
duty-free, assemble them with cheap Mexican labor, and export the
finished products to U.S. and other markets."' 67 In 1989 Mexican
maquila workers earned an average of $1.63 per hour versus $14.32
for U.S. workers. 68 In addition, "Mexico's proximity to U.S. markets
is also an obvious advantage." 69
The maquiladora program was established in 1965 in response to
problems of economic underdevelopment in northern Mexico that
originated when thousands of Mexicans left the interior's farmlands
for more lucrative industrial jobs in the border communities. 70 In
1965 the President of Mexico announced the first border industriali-
zation program. In 1971, the Mexican government codified the pro-
gram's provisions and procedures in the Mexican Customs Code,
"and on August 15, 1983, the Presidential Decree for the Promotion
and Operation of the Maquiladora Export Industry was issued and
published in the Official Gazette of Mexico."' 71 The program is cur-
rently regulated by the 1989 Presidential Decree for the promotion
and operation of the In-Bond export industry.72 In 1989, United
States-Mexico trade reached $52 billion 73 and in 1990, close to
500,000 people were employed by the maquiladoras.74
While the differences in the stages of economic development be-
tween the United States and Mexico necessarily create alternative na-
tional priorities, Mexico has begun to show more concern for
environmental protection. 75 In 1987 the Mexican Government
amended article 27 of its constitution, which now reads "The Nation
shall at all times have the right to impose on private ownership meas-
ures required by the public interest ... to preserve and restore eco-
logical balance." '76
As a result of bilateral negotiations, in 1983 the Presidents of
the United States and Mexico signed the Agreement on Cooperation
for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Bor-
66 Elizabeth C. Rose, Note, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Management Problems
and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L LAw. 223, 223 (1989).
67 Id. (footnotes omitted).
68 Stephen Baker et. al., Mexico: A New Economic Era, Bus. WK., Nov. 12, 1990, 102,
105 (diagram).
69 Rose, supra note 66, at 229.
70 Id.
71 Id. (footnotes omitted).
72 Daniel I. Basurto Gonzalez & Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of Maqui-
ladora Operations: A Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 659, 660
(1991)(footnote omitted).
73 Baker, supra note 68, at 103 (diagram).
74 Id. at 105 (diagram).
75 Rose, supra note 66, at 239-42.
76 Id. at 237.
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der Area 77 (1983 Agreement). In an attempt to combat the problem
of exportation of hazardous waste, the 1983 Agreement has been
supplemented with Annex III to the 1983 Agreement. 78
Annex III covers the transfrontier shipment of hazardous
waste. 79 Article I of Annex III defines the EPA as the designated
authority in the case of the United States and the Secretariat of Ur-
ban Development and Ecology (SUDE) as the designated authority
in the case of Mexico. 80 Article I then defines hazardous waste as
"any waste, as designated or defined by the applicable designated
authority ..... 81 Mexico has requirements for the disposal, recla-
mation, recycling, or use in Mexico of hazardous waste generated by
raw material imported from the United States; however, if these haz-
ardous wastes are not disposed of, reclaimed, recycled, or used ac-
cording to Mexican requirements, the hazardous wastes must be
shipped back to the United States.82 Annex III, in turn, requires that
hazardous waste generated from raw materials imported from the
United States and used by the maquiladoras shall continue to be
readmitted to the United States. 85
IV. Significance of the Case
A. Rationale Underlying Templet
While the Commerce Clause may give Congress the power to let
77 1983 Agreement, supra note 44. It should be noted that this is an executive agree-
ment and not a formal treaty. The ability of the President to make such agreements, and
the effect of such agreements, is itself a very involved subject. One author has stated:
Considerable controversy exists over the President's constitutional power to
use executive agreements in resolving international disputes. The U.S. Con-
stitution does not specifically provide for the use of executive agreements to
direct foreign policy. Nor does federal law stipulate when an executive
agreement may be used instead of a treaty. Nevertheless, the use of execu-
tive agreements to resolve international disputes is becoming more common,
and such agreements surpass treaties in number.
Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between Mexico and the United
States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderlands, 19 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 87, 123
n.202 (1986)(footnotes omitted). Sinclair further stated that "[a]n executive agreement
lacks the enforceability of a treaty; its success depends on continued political goodwill
between national governments." Id. at 123 (footnote omitted).
78 Annex III, supra note 44.
79 Id.
80 Id. art. I, par. 1.
81 Id. art. I, par. 2.
82 Gonzalez & Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 674 n.69.
83 Annex III, supra note 44, at art. XI. Article XI is titled "Hazardous Waste Gener-
ated From Raw Materials Admitted In-Bond" and reads as follows: "Hazardous waste gen-
erated in the processes of economic production, manufacturing, processing or repair, for
which raw materials were utilized and temporarily admitted, shall continue to be readmit-
ted by the country of origin of the raw materials in accordance with applicable national
policies, laws and regulations." Id.
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foreign hazardous waste be imported into the United States, 84 it
does not answer the question of what becomes of the hazardous
waste once it is inside the United States. The court in Templet stated
that "[a]lthough the Congress's regulatory power over interstate
commerce may be limited by federalism and state sovereignty, the
Supreme Court has not held that such limitations apply to the Con-
gress's power to regulate foreign commerce." 85 The Supreme Court
stated that "[f]oreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national
concern,"8 6 and further stated that there is evidence that the Foun-
ders intended the foreign commerce power to be greater than inter-
state commerce power.8 7
The logic used in Templet implies that states could use the con-
cepts of federalism and state sovereignty to limit the treatment, stor-
age, or disposal of certain specific types of hazardous waste even
though they would be powerless to ban their importation. The court
in Templet stated that "[tlhe problem with LDEQs argument is that
Louisiana's ban is based on the origin of the hazardous waste, rather
than on the specific type of hazardous waste."88 According to the
Templet court:
Although the hazardous waste which the plaintiff seeks to dispose of
in Louisiana is generated in Mexico, the Carlyss [Louisiana] facility
is already receiving the same type of hazardous waste from plants
located within the United States. The only difference between the
Mexican and United States waste is that Mexican water is used in
Mexico while American water is used in the United States.8 9
The court in Templet clearly carried over the original analysis that the
Supreme Court used regarding domestically produced waste in City
of Philadelphia. In City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court stated:
The harms caused by waste are said to arise after its disposal in land-
fill sites, and at that point, as NewJersey concedes, there is no basis
to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste. If one is in-
herently harmful, so is the other. Yet New Jersey has banned the
84 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1152-53; see, e.g., Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 448-49 n.13 (1978).
The court in Templet states that "[t]he Congress's plenary power to regulate foreign
commerce is well established." Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1152. The Templet court failed to
discuss the fact that the hazardous waste involved in this case was imported under an exec-
utive agreement and not under the authority of Congress. See supra notes 77-83 and ac-
companying text.
85 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1152-53.
86 Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448.
87 Id. The Court stated:
Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regu-
late commerce "with foreign Nations" and "among the several States" in
parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of
the foreign commerce power to be the greater. Cases of this Court, stressing
the need for uniformity in treating with other nations, echo this distinction.
Id.
88 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1152-53.
89 Id. at 1149.
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former while leaving its landfill sites open to the latter. 90
The Supreme Court was more concerned with whether out-of-state
waste was being discriminated against than with New Jersey's mo-
tives and indicated that it would be permissible for New Jersey to
restrict certain wastes from landfills so long as it did not discriminate
on the basis of origin:
[W]e assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents'
pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed as
well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow of
all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate
commerce may incidentally be affected. 9 1
It would appear that a state may inhibit shipment into the state of
certain classes of hazardous waste and ban treatment, storage, or dis-
posal of them if the state has banned all such treatment, storage, or
disposal for the protection of its citizens.
B. Implications of the Templet Logic
Louisiana's statutes were declared unconstitutional because they
were "based solely on the origin of an object of commerce."'9 2 It is
useful to speculate on what the results would be if only specific types
of hazardous waste already banned in the state were covered by the
statutes. It would appear that some of the wording of the statutes
could be modified so as to prevent them from violating the Com-
merce Clause under either its foreign or interstate components. One
of the sections of the relevant statutes reads: "It shall be unlawful for
any person to receive for treatment, storage, or disposal in this state
any hazardous waste generated outside the United States or its terri-
tories." 93 The court in Templet, relying on the rationale used in City
of Philadelphia, found the violation in the word "any." In City of Phila-
delphia the Supreme court noted the two prongs of the Interstate
Commerce Clause analysis, the per se rule of invalidity in cases of eco-
nomic protectionism, 94 such as that used by Templet, 9 5 and a balanc-
ing test where discrimination is not patent and where legitimate state
interests are advanced, as in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.96 The Court in
Bruce Church held that a state law requiring all cantaloupes grown do-
mestically be packaged within the state before being shipped out-of-
state violated the Interstate Commerce Clause.9 7 The rule used in
90 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
91 Id. at 626 (emphasis in original).
92 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1153.
93 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2190(C) (West 1989).
94 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; see, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948); Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925).
95 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1153.
96 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
97 Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 145-46.
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Bruce Church was stated as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities.
9 8
Relying on this second prong balancing test and the Templet court's
prohibition of the concept of "any," if the statute was limited to cer-
tain classes of hazardous waste to protect bona fide state interests,
instead of banning "any" foreign hazardous waste, it might not vio-
late the Interstate Commerce Clause. In addition, it would appear
not to violate the Foreign Commerce Clause because importation it-
self of these certain classes of hazardous wastes would not be
banned, but only treatment, storage, or disposal within the state.
It has also been suggested by one writer that an individual state
could inhibit the flow of domestic hazardous waste into that state by
instituting and enforcing strict recycling and waste minimization leg-
islation. 99 This would be done under the theory that states may ban
waste from other states that do not have their own programs which
meet or exceed the standards of recycling and waste minimization of
the destination state.' 00 This method may pass the balancing test of
Bruce Church as it promotes bona fide state interests and applies even
handedly to both in-state and out-of-state generated hazardous
wastes. The Supreme Court indicated in Sporhase v. Nebraska 101 that
a reciprocity requirement governing the use of natural resources in
interstate commerce may be permissible if the state can demonstrate
a close fit between the reciprocity requirement and the state's as-
serted local purpose. If the foreign country did not meet the desti-
nation state's minimum standards in this area, under the above
analysis, and under Templet, it would seem that the foreign country's
hazardous waste could also be banned from the destination state for
treatment, storage, or disposal in the same manner as domestically
produced hazardous waste.
C. Tensions Between Applying the Foreign and Interstate Components
of the Commerce Clause
If states have the power to inhibit or ban certain types of domes-
98 Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted); see Susan Adams Brietzke, Note,
Hazardous Waste in Interstate Commerce: Minimizing the Problem After City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 77, 92-93 (1989).
99 Brietzke, supra note 98, at 104.
100 Id.
101 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
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tic hazardous waste, what becomes of the foreign waste once it is
imported into a state and becomes the equivalent of domestically
generated hazardous waste? It follows that if a state can inhibit or
ban the treatment, storage, or disposal of certain types of domesti-
cally produced hazardous waste, then a state could apply the same
restrictions to the same types of foreign hazardous waste. Courts
could require that shipment of these certain types of hazardous
waste be allowed under the Commerce Clause without destroying
the analogy of foreign hazardous wastes to domestically generated
hazardous waste. If shipment is allowed, but treatment, storage, or
disposal is not allowed, the hazardous waste will end up being
shipped to another state. But there would be nothing to prevent
other states from also banning the treatment, storage, or disposal of
these certain types of hazardous waste. In other words, the foreign
component of the Commerce Clause can be interpreted to mean that
foreign hazardous waste must be allowed into the United States over
any objections by a state. But the interstate component of the Com-
merce Clause under the balancing test as stated in Bruce Church 102
should allow states to ban the treatment, storage, or disposal of cer-
tain types of foreign hazardous wastes if the statute regulates even
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest.
It may be that in applying the balancing test used in City of Phila-
delphia, the courts will hold that any attempt to ban certain types of
hazardous wastes from treatment, storage, or disposal violates the
test's limiting language of "with effects upon interstate commerce
that are only incidental."'10 3 This holding would indicate that state
laws which promote a bona fide state interest and even-handedly ap-
ply to both instate and out-of-state generated hazardous wastes
would be considered to have more than an incidental effect on inter-
state commerce. The courts could also disallow any quarantine ex-
ception to the Interstate Commerce Clause even though there is a
ban on in-state generated hazardous wastes of these certain types.
These holdings would have many ramifications on state programs
and Congress's attempts to allocate equitably domestically generated
hazardous waste. The total effect such holdings would have in the
area of hazardous waste shipments and on other areas of law that
involve the Commerce Clause is not clear.
A final possibility may be that courts would allow a state to ban
certain types of in-state produced hazardous waste from treatment,
storage, or disposal within the state, yet hold that under the Com-
merce Clause, the state could not apply such a ban to foreign or out-
of-state generated hazardous wastes. The courts could do this by
holding that such a ban would impose a burden on such commerce
102 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
103 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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that is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 10 4
It would seem anomalous, however, that a state could ban the in-
state generation of certain types of hazardous waste, yet be power-
less to keep out these same types of hazardous wastes solely because
they were generated in foreign countries or other states. It must be
remembered that the court in Templet said that "[i]t is also clear that
the Congress did not intend to preempt all state environmental laws
when it enacted RCRA."' 05 The court in Templet further stated that
"[s]tates are not precluded from 'adopting or enforcing require-
ments which are more stringent or extensive' or 'operating a pro-
gram with greater scope of coverage' than required by the minimum
federal standards."' 10 6
D. Possible Ramifications of the Templet Rationale
As states seek to minimize damages to their environmental qual-
ity, certain specific types of hazardous waste seem likely to be banned
from states that have little or no generation of such types of wastes
within that state. Currently, many types of industrial processing are
already moving to foreign countries. In 1987 alone, the number of
maquiladoras increased thirty percent.' 0 7 It is also recognized that
"[uinquestionably, one of the most serious potential pollution
problems faced by Mexico is that, until recently, virtually no legal
provisions or physical facilities existed for the proper disposal of haz-
ardous and toxic materials." 08
Currently "[m]any developing countries consider imports of
hazardous wastes from industrialized countries a form of neo-colo-
nialist exploitation, to be avoided regardless of any possible financial
benefit to the country."' 0 9 The step from considering importation
of hazardous wastes, itself, as neo-colonialist exploitation, to consid-
ering the importation of industrial processing plants that generate
such hazardous wastes, as neo-colonialist exploitation is a small one.
Indeed, "[ciritics of the maquiladora program assert the maquilas rep-
resent the worst aspects of United States industry - exploiting poor
Mexicans and turning Mexico into a United States chemical waste
dump.""t0 Requirements similar to Mexico's requirement that cer-
tain hazardous wastes be readmitted to the country that brought in
the raw materials responsible for these wastes il I may be one of the
104 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
105 Templet, 770 F. Supp. at 1146-47.
106 Id. at 1147 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(1991)).
107 Rose, supra note 66, at 224.
108 Id. at 226.
109 David J. Abrams, Note, Regulating the International Hazardous Waste Trade: A Proposed
Global Solution, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 810-11 (1990).
110 Gonzalez & Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 662 (footnote omitted).
I I I Annex III, supra note 44, art. XI.
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more viable means of insuring environmental quality in some devel-
oping countries.
The court in National Solid Wastes quoted an EPA document that
stated "Congress was concerned that certain states, because of polit-
ical pressures and public opposition, were not able to create and to
permit sufficient facilities within their borders to treat and securely
dispose of (or manage) the amounts of wastes produced in those
states."11 2 The court in National Solid Wastes noted that "[t]he provi-
sion of SARA at issue in this case, section 104(c)(9), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(c)(9), requires that each state present a proposal to EPA
showing that the state will have adequate capacity available to dis-
pose of the hazardous wastes generated within the state for the next
twenty years."'' 3 These measures will protect certain states from
becoming overburdened by hazardous wastes generated in other
states, even though the states are unable to stop interstate shipment
into their state. This legislation may also encourage the minimiza-
tion of hazardous waste generation."14
There is no such mechanism to prevent the increasing amount
of foreign generated hazardous waste, once it is inside the United
States, from being "dumped" into selected states under the holding
of Templet. There also appears to be little incentive for either Mexico
or the hazardous waste generating companies to minimize the
amount of hazardous waste generated. As states discourage certain
hazardous waste producing industry, it can be expected that this may
become an encouragement to export this waste generating industry.
However, the hazardous wastes may well end up coming back to the
United States.
It is possible that if some states ban all of a certain specific type
of hazardous waste, whether domestic or foreign, the remaining
states who do not ban such waste will have more and more foreign
hazardous waste funneled into them. States wishing to avoid being
the resting place for such foreign generated hazardous waste may in
turn ban both domestically and foreign generated waste of that class
in their state, or require that source states and countries have recip-
rocal strict recycling and minimization laws, further increasing the
pressures on the remaining states.
On the petition for rehearing of National Solid Wastes "15 the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals faced a similar issue regarding Ala-
bama's strict pre-approval standard for hazardous wastes, which
112 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management,
910 F.2d 713, 716 (11 th Cir. 1990)(quoting OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RE-
SPONSE, U.S. EPA, ASSURANCE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: GUIDANCE TO STATE OFFI-
CIALS, 2 (Dec. 1988)).
113 Id.
114 See Brietzke, supra note 98, at 90.
1 15 924 F.2d 1001 (11 th Cir. 1990).
416 [VOL. 17
HAZARDOUS WASTE IMPORTATION
applied to both in-state and out-of-state waste generators. The
Court of Appeals held that a balancing test was appropriate" 6 and
that the case must be remanded to district court for further proceed-
ings on "the extent of the burden imposed by the pre-approval regu-
lations on interstate commerce and the constitutionality of those
regulations."" 17 However, in the part of the original circuit court
opinion in National Solid Wastes that was withdrawn by the later opin-
ion concerning the petition for rehearing,' l 8 the court stated that
"[b]ecause the regulations impose substantial economic burdens on
both intrastate and interstate commerce, the local benefits must be
great for these regulations to be valid."" 9
V. Conclusion
Templet relied on two major premises: (1) that Congress's power
is greater under the foreign component of the Commerce Clause
than under the interstate component of the Commerce Clause and
(2) that foreign produced hazardous waste, once imported into the
United States, is analogous to domestically produced hazardous
waste. By basing its decision on these premises the court failed to
address the problem of how such foreign hazardous waste will be
allocated among the states. The rationale used may give some states
an incentive to ban or inhibit specific types of hazardous wastes.
This could be detrimental to the same types of domestic hazardous
waste generating industries, to states that will lose these industries,
and also to the states who will end up receiving the foreign hazard-
ous waste.
The delicate balance achieved in allocating hazardous waste
among the states and the incentives for recycling and waste genera-
tion minimization may have been upset. The court should not rely
on the Interstate Commerce Clause to deal with foreign hazardous
waste; by doing so the stage may now be set for certain states to
become dumping grounds for specific types of hazardous wastes.
The courts should recognize that foreign hazardous waste is still
uniquely foreign even after its importation into the United States.
Barring this recognition, a whole new framework may have to be de-
veloped to equitably allocate hazardous waste among the states. It
may be that Congress will pass legislation that will clarify this situa-
tion, although there is no indication this will happen. Hopefully the
need for such changes in policy or rationale will be recognized and
116 Id. at 1004.
''7 Id.
118 Part 11-C of the original opinion was withdrawn. See id.
119 National Solid W1astes, 910 F.2d at 725.
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action taken before the situation escalates and causes both economic
and environmental misallocation.
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